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The Other Eighty Percent: Private Investment Funds, 
International Tax Avoidance, and Tax-Exempt 
Investors 
Omri Marian* 
 The taxation of private equity managers’ share of funds’ profits—the 
twenty percent “carried interest”—received much attention in academic 
literature and popular discourse. Much has been said and written about 
the fact that fund managers’ profits are taxed at preferred rates. But 
what about the other eighty percent of funds’ profits? This Article 
theorizes that the bulk of such profits are never taxed. This is a result of a 
combination of three factors: First, private equity, venture capital, and 
hedge funds (collectively, Private Investment Funds, or “PIFs”) are 
major actors in cross-border investment activity. This enables PIFs to take 
advantage of international taxation planning schemes not available in 
a purely domestic context. Second, PIFs are aggressive tax-planners. The 
Article summarizes some existing evidence that suggests that PIF-
controlled multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) are more likely to engage 
in aggressive international tax behavior when compared with MNEs that 
are not PIF-controlled. The result is that PIF-controlled entities are 
uniquely situated to avoid tax at the source jurisdiction. Lastly, PIFs are 
dominated by tax-exempt investors. This enables PIF profits, which 
escaped source taxation, to also escape taxation at the jurisdiction of 
residence. The result is that most private equity gains from cross-border 
investment activity are taxed nowhere. The Article concludes, therefore, 
that PIF-controlled entities should be a target of international tax policy 
making. However, such policymaking must be grounded in better 
understanding of PIFs’ international tax behavior. This is a difficult 
task, since PIF operations are rarely subject to public disclosure 
requirements. The Article proposes opening PIF international tax 
planning to public scrutiny through a revision of the country-by-country 
reporting (CBCR) standards adopted under Action 13 of the BEPS 
Project. It is hoped that information garnered from such increased 
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Scholars Workshop. Any errors or omissions are my own. 
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reporting will assist in developing anti-tax-avoidance policies that are 
better targeted at PIF-controlled MNEs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article links two seemingly separate academic discourses in 
taxation which, for the most part, have run parallel courses without 
significantly engaging each other. The first is the discourse on the 
taxation of private equity funds,1 hedge funds,2 and venture capital 
funds,3 collectively referred to as private investment funds (“PIFs”). 
The second is the discourse on international tax avoidance.4 
The common characteristic of all PIFs is that they pool funds from 
private investors with significant financial capability and use such funds 
to invest in portfolio companies.5 The fund managers—who sponsor 
the funds and raise capital from investors—are paid certain fees6 and 
receive a share of the fund’s profits if the fund is successful.7 
There is a large volume of literature on the taxation of PIFs.8 The 
bulk of the discourse, however, is focused on the taxation of PIF 
 
 1. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX 
NOTES 615 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter: Polsky, Compendium]; Chris William Sanchirico, The 
Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers With Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is 
It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership 
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., David S. Miller & Jean Bertrand, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Hedge 
Funds, Their Investors, and Their Managers, 65 TAX LAW. 209 (2012); Alan L. Kennard, The 
Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133 (2004). 
 3. See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation, in 3 TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 47 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1989), http://www.nber.org/
chapters/c10945.pdf. 
 4. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016); Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate 
Tax System Fit for the 21st Century?, FISC. STUD. (forthcoming 2016); Yariv Brauner, What the 
BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014). 
 5. THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J CURVE: MANAGING A 
PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 1–40 (2005) (describing 
private equity fund operating models); see also Miller & Bertrand, supra note 2, at 311–24. It is 
important to note that private equity funds and venture capital funds share more common tax 
features with each other than with hedge funds, and in some instance the discussion herein may 
be more relevant to the first two. However, all three share the most important features for 
purposes of this Article, which are (1) the pooling of private investors’ funds, (2) management 
compensation related to performance, and (3) significant cross-border activity. 
 6. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
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managers.9 Academic literature frequently discusses the preferential 
tax treatment accorded to the taxation of fund managers’ twenty 
percent profits interest (known as “carried interest”)10 or the 
conversion of management fees from ordinary income to capital 
gains.11 Relatively little attention is given to the taxation of portfolio 
companies held by PIFs12 or of PIF investors that earn the other eighty 
percent of the PIFs’ investment returns (left after the managers 
claimed their part of the profits). Literature on PIF taxation also rarely 
takes into account international tax considerations. 
The purpose of this Article is to make first strides in filling this 
gap. PIF investments account for a substantial part of cross-border 
investment activity.13 PIFs and their portfolio companies are able to 
take advantage of multiple international tax planning opportunities 
that are not available in a purely domestic context.14 Thus, PIF-
controlled entities are uniquely situated to engage in aggressive 
income stripping in the jurisdictions in which they operate, 
eliminating source taxation.15 Moreover, since a significant portion of 
PIF investors are tax-exempt,16 income stripped at the source is never 
taxed at the residence jurisdiction of the investors.17 PIFs are thus 
particularly successful vehicles of so-called “double nontaxation.”18 It 
 
 9. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 10. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 616 (“[T]he carried interest loophole has 
already been the subject of intense debate and scrutiny . . . .”). 
 11. Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743 
(2009) [hereinafter Polsky, Fee Conversions]. 
 12. For one of the rare example of a discussion of portfolio-level tax planning, see Gregg 
D. Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, 142 TAX NOTES 556 (June 2, 
2014) [hereinafter Polsky, Disguised Dividends]. 
 13. See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
 15. “Source taxation” or “taxation at source” refers to the ability of the jurisdiction where 
meaningful economic activity takes place to tax profits from such activity. 
 16. See Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 616 (“[L]imited partners generally do not 
pay U.S. taxes, either because they are tax-exempt or foreign”). The magnitude of PIF investor-
base tax exemption is discussed further infra at Section IV.C. 
 17. “Residence taxation” refers to the ability of the jurisdiction where investors reside to 
tax the profits earned by such investors. 
 18. By “double nontaxation,” this Article refers to the violation of the “single tax 
principle,” under which income from cross-border activity should be taxed once (not more than 
once, but also not less than once). See, REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 40–42 (2007) 
(discussing the Single Tax Principle). “Double non-taxation” violates the “single tax principle,” 
since income is taxed nowhere (meaning, “less than once”). 
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is therefore somewhat surprising that the international aspect of PIF 
tax planning has escaped discussion thus far. 
This state of affairs is even more curious given the centrality of 
international tax avoidance to tax policy discourse over the last few 
decades. International tax avoidance has played a major role in 
international policymaking at least since the 1990s, when the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) launched an effort to combat “harmful tax 
competition.”19 More recently, the OECD has been engaged in the 
Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (“BEPS”) Project.20 The BEPS 
Project is probably the largest ever internationally-coordinated effort 
to address tax avoidance by MNEs.21 
However, within the context of BEPS (as well as other 
international initiatives to combat tax avoidance), the role of PIFs has 
been largely neglected. Current discourse is focused on tax planning 
schemes executed by corporate MNEs, and on governmental practices 
that may facilitate MNEs’ tax avoidance. This means that the focus is 
on entity-level taxation, but the role of investors and corporate 
managers in facilitating entity-level outcomes is largely ignored. 
MNEs’ international tax avoidance behavior may be affected by those 
who control MNEs. 
In the context of source taxation, this Article proposes that PIF-
controlled MNEs are more likely to display aggressive international 
tax behavior compared with MNEs that are not PIF-controlled. It 
supplements previous empirical studies supporting this assertion22 by 
offering possible explanations to PIF-controlled MNEs’ tax-
 
 19. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998). 
 20. See Base Erosion and Profits Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 21. See History, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Nov. 1, 
2016) (stating BEPS comprised of thirty-nine countries accounting for eighty percent of world 
trade and investment). Under the BEPS framework “over 100 countries and jurisdictions are 
collaborating to implement the BEPS measures and tackle BEPS.” See OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 22. See C. S. Agnes Cheng et. al., The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax 
Avoidance, 87 ACCT. REV. 1493 (2012) (finding that firms backed by activist hedge-fund 
investors engage in more tax avoidance than similar firms not backed by hedge-funds); Brad A. 
Badertscher et al, The Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Tax Avoidance, 56 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 228 (2013) (finding that firms backed by private equity funds engage in more 
tax avoidance than similar firms management-owned firms). 
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aggressiveness and concludes that PIF-controlled MNEs have fewer 
constraints on source tax planning compared with other MNEs. 
For example, some studies have found that MNEs’ tax behavior 
may be somewhat constrained by reputational issues.23 PIFs, on the 
other hand, are rarely subject to public disclosure requirements. Such 
opacity makes PIFs less vulnerable to reputational constraints. 
Moreover, since the investment horizon of PIFs is limited,24 
management of portfolio MNEs may be less affected by long term 
reputational risks. In addition, even if a PIF-controlled MNE suffers 
negative reputational consequences due to aggressive tax behavior, it 
seems unlikely that the PIF itself will be tainted; rather, the MNE and 
its future shareholders are likely to bear the reputational risk. 
A short investment horizon may also operate to negate MNEs’ 
interest in the long-term economic health of the source jurisdiction. 
While MNEs have a clear interest in reducing their tax liability at the 
source, they may also have an interest in the financial health of the 
jurisdiction in which they operate. MNEs benefit from an 
environment of developed infrastructure, skilled labor, and legal 
certainty. In other words, MNEs’ tax planning may be constrained by 
their interest in the source jurisdiction’s long-term public outlays.25 
 
 23. See generally Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? 
Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 
126 (2009) (finding that share prices sometimes react negatively to news of corporate 
involvement in tax controversies, though generally to a limited extent); John R. Graham et. al., 
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field, 89 ACCT. REV. 991, 991 
(2014) (surveying tax executives and finding that “69 percent of executives rate reputation as 
important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why 
firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy”); Victor Fleischer, A Brand New Deal: The 
Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (discussing the 
effect of reputational considerations on the structuring of tax-planning schemes). But cf. Birgit 
Huesecken et. al., Capital Market Reaction to Tax Avoidance: Evidence from LuxLeaks (2016) 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848757 (finding that 
investors react positively to news about firm’s tax avoidance). 
 24. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 25. See, e.g., REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 139 (2011) (explaining that reduced taxation may 
incentivize foreign direct investment, but at the same time may hurt public outlays on 
infrastructure, which creates a disincentive for foreign direct investment); Joshua D. Moore, The 
Economic Importance of Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: An Analysis of 
International Corporate Tax Harmonization Proposals and Lessons from the Winning Corporate 
Tax Strategy in Ireland, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 345, 375 (2007) 
(“[B]ecause MNEs benefit from tax expenditures and provisions of public goods and services, 
they are unlikely to drive the rates to zero”). 
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PIF-controlled MNEs, however, are not similarly constrained by such 
considerations. Since a PIF will necessarily exit the jurisdiction within 
a relatively short, known timeframe, its interest in the long-term 
economic health of the source jurisdiction seems not as strong. 
Another tax planning constraint that PIF-controlled MNEs avoid 
is associated with the identity of their investors. Aggressive tax 
behavior by MNEs may adversely affect shareholder-level taxes.26 
Shareholder interests may negate aggressive corporate-level tax 
planning, to the extent planning creates investor-level tax burden.27 
Most PIF investors, however, are tax-exempt. As such, PIF investors 
have little concern with shareholder-level tax, and in fact share the 
manager’s interest in reducing portfolio-level tax. The only significant 
taxable “investors” in PIFs are the fund managers, whose incentive 
pay is subject to taxation. The result is that PIF portfolio-level tax 
planning is largely driven by management-level tax considerations. 
Finally, PIFs are rarely taxable entities themselves. They are usually 
organized as pass-through entities, and as such are not viewed as 
potential targets of tax policymaking. This may contribute to the 
opacity in the context of PIF portfolio tax planning, which may enable 
aggressive behavior to go unnoticed. 
The fact that PIFs are particularly aggressive in source tax planning 
is exacerbated by the fact that income is also rarely taxed at residence. 
Under conservative assumptions,28 about two-thirds of PIF interests 
are owned by tax-exempt investors. PIF returns thus remain largely 
untaxed at residence.  
All of the suggested explanations for PIFs’ aggressive international 
tax behavior demand further scrutiny. In order to address this issue, 
we must better understand PIF international tax behavior. But such a 
task is impossible given PIFs’ tax opacity. The main recommendation, 
therefore, is to increase the transparency of PIF international tax 
schemes. Transparency indeed seems to be a common theme of tax 
reforms these days.29 The OECD is currently engaged in the BEPS 
Project aimed at addressing international tax avoidance. The most 
 
 26. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 27. See Inder K. Khurana & William J. Moser, Institutional Shareholders’ Investment 
Horizons and Tax Avoidance, 35 J. AM. ACCT. ASSOC. 111 (2013) (finding that long-term 
institutional shareholders have a mitigating effect on corporate tax planning). 
 28. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 29. See discussion infra Part III. 
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important contribution of the BEPS Project to international taxation 
is probably the introduction of the CBCR requirement, which will 
impose an increased reporting burden on MNEs, and is expected to 
significantly increase tax transparency.30 While CBCR is potentially 
applicable to PIFs, this Article argues that under the current 
formulation, most PIFs will not be subjected to CBCR. It is therefore 
proposed to expand CBCR to include most PIFs. Increased 
transparency will hopefully constrain aggressive tax planning by PIF-
controlled MNEs and provide better information, which is necessary 
for formulating new tax policies that target PIFs’ aggressive cross-
border tax behavior. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I explains some common 
characteristics of PIFs’ operations and provides a brief background on 
the taxation of PIFs. Part II explains the role of PIFs in the 
international context. It uses a database of recently leaked documents 
to explain the mechanics of international tax avoidance by PIF-
controlled entities. Part III suggests possible explanations to PIF-
portfolio international tax behavior, and explains the importance of 
such issues to international tax discourse. Part IV turns the focus to 
PIF-investors’ residence taxation, assessing the size of PIFs’ tax-
exempt investor base. Finally, Part V recommends expanding the 
newly created tax transparency requirements, such as CBCR, to 
include PIFs. 
I. THE BASICS OF PIF TAXATION 
This Part provides a brief background on the operation and 
taxation of PIFs. Section A discusses the basic structure of PIF 
operations. Section B briefly summarizes some of the tax 
consequences to fund managers. Section C considers some of the tax 
consequences to the portfolio companies. 
A. PIFs: The Basic Structure 
While PIFs vary in legal structure and investment strategies, their 
basic operative model is similar.31 Consider the following 
basic structure: 
 
 30. See Brauner, supra note 4, at 105 (calling CBCR “a major achievement of the 
BEPS project”). 
 31. For a review of private equity and venture capital funds’ business structure and 
operations, see MAYER & MATHONET, supra note 5, at 27–40. 
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A fund’s sponsor raises funds from investors who commit capital 
to the fund. The sponsor then uses the funds to identify and purchase 
portfolio companies (or other investment opportunities), manage 
them, and eventually dispose of them, hopefully at a profit. 
The fund itself is typically structured as a partnership for tax 
purposes. The investors invest in the fund as limited partners.32 The 
limited partners’ capital commitments to the fund typically account 
for ninety-nine percent of all capital commitments in the aggregate. 
The additional one percent comes from the general partner, an affiliate 
of the fund’s sponsor.33 The one percent commitment from the 
sponsor is intended to align the interests of the fund sponsor with that 
of the limited partners by having the sponsor share some of the 
investment risk. 
Another affiliate of the sponsor, the management company (or 
simply the “manager”), is tasked with the actual management of the 
fund’s portfolio. In return for the management services, the manager 
receives a management fee. The fee is typically calculated on an annual 
 
 32. Id. at 11 (referring to the limited partnerships as the “dominant form” of PE funds). 
 33. Id. at 34 (“Typically, investors in private equity funds see 1% as standard 
and acceptable.”). 
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basis, usually at a level of two percent of all committed capital.34 The 
management fee is usually paid on a quarterly basis. 
The management fee is not the sponsor’s main monetary 
incentive. Rather, if the fund is successful, the sponsor shares in the 
profits. Once the fund investments are disposed of,35 the realized 
proceeds will first be distributed to the limited partners to pay them 
back their capital investment, plus a pre-agreed rate of return (known 
as the “hurdle,” which is typically set at eight to ten percent).36 Any 
remaining profits are distributed eighty percent to the investors (this 
includes one percent to the general partner on account of its capital 
investment), and the remaining twenty percent to the general partner 
as incentive pay. Such incentive pay is known as “carried interest.”37 
The fund life is limited in duration. The manager usually raises 
funds from the investors to finance investment during an “investment 
period” that typically lasts up to five years.38 The manager commits to 
dispose of the investments and distribute the proceeds within a period 
that typically lasts no more than five years after the commitment 
period. Thus, a typical fund rarely exists for a period that lasts more 
than ten years.39 As a consequence, the investment horizon of PIFs 
is limited.  
B. PIF Managers’ Tax Consequences 
The tax consequences of fund managers have been addressed at 
length elsewhere.40 The purpose here is to provide only the necessary 
background for PIFs’ management taxation, and not to add to this 
voluminous literature.41 
 
 34. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8 (“A general partner (GP) manages the partnership in 
exchange for an annual management fee, usually two percent of the fund’s committed capital.”). 
 35. In some funds this is done on an investment-by-investment basis. 
 36. MAYER & MATHONET, supra note 5, at 33 (discussing the hurdle rate). 
 37. Id. at 32–33 (discussing the carried interest). 
 38. Id. at 11 (“The main part of the capital is drawn during the ‘investment period’, [sic] 
typically 4 or 5 years, where new opportunities are identified.”). 
 39. Id. (“The fund usually has a contractually limited life of 7–10 years. The fund 
manager’s objective is to realise all investments before or at the liquidation of the partnership. 
Often there is a provision for an extension of 2–3 years.”). 
 40. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 41. For an excellent recent summary of this literature, see Polsky, Compendium, 
supra note 1. 
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Probably the most well-known aspect of funds’ management 
taxation is the taxation of carried interest. This incentive pay, 
amounting to twenty percent of profits, represents the bulk of the gain 
to successful fund managers. Carried interest is clearly paid in return 
for services rendered by the fund manager (that is, the successful 
management of the fund investment). However, under current law, 
the carried interest is not subject to taxation on the fund managers’ 
personal marginal tax rate like regular wage income. Rather, it is taxed 
as if it represents a return on capital investment and taxed at the 
preferential tax rates imposed on capital gains.42 
The management fees paid by the fund to the manager are taxed 
as ordinary income to the fund manager, and are deductible to the 
fund. This is a straight forward outcome, which is not particularly 
favorable to the fund managers because the fee income is taxed at the 
manager’s personal tax rate. While the payments are deductible to the 
fund, the fund has little use for such deductions. The reason is that 
the funds are usually organized as partnerships, which are transparent 
for tax purposes. The deductions thus flow to the investors, who may 
use them to offset their own income. However, most fund investors 
are tax-exempt,43 and thus have little use for such deductions. 
Fund managers have therefore engaged in a tax planning strategy 
known as management fee waivers. Fee waiver schemes vary in terms 
and complexity, but generically involve managers waiving their two 
percent management fee in return for priority allocations of fund gains 
of the same amount. Managers then take the position that the fees are 
treated as capital gains, rather than ordinary income. Commentators 
have suggested that such schemes are extremely aggressive, and 
potentially illegal.44 The Treasury has recently addressed management 
fee waivers by promulgating regulations to shut down most 
such schemes.45 
C. PIFs Portfolio Tax Planning 
Business entities are naturally interested in reducing their tax 
liability to the extent legally allowed. However, the unique business 
 
 42. For an analysis of the taxation of carried interest, see Fleischer, supra note 1, at 9–15. 
 43. For a discussion of this strategy, see Polsky, Fee Conversions, supra note 11. 
 44. Id. at 743 (arguing that fee waivers planning is “extremely aggressive and subject to 
serious challenge by the IRS”). 
 45. Disguised Payments for Services, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2, 80 Fed. Reg. 43652 
(Aug. 19, 2015). 
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model of PIFs may suggest there is something special about the tax 
planning of entities controlled by PIFs. This issue has been largely 
neglected in academic literature. 
One exception to the dearth of literature on PIF portfolio 
planning involves fees paid by the portfolio companies to the funds 
that control them. Professor Gregg Polsky explains that fund 
managers may charge portfolio companies fees for so-called 
“management services” provided by the fund (or the fund managers) 
to the companies.46 Such fees, known as “monitoring fees,” are used 
to offset the management fees so as not to alter the economic deal of 
the fund.47 However, while the economic substance remains 
unchanged, the monitoring fees are deductible at the portfolio 
company level, thus eliminating some of the portfolio-level tax 
liability. The fund’s tax-exempt investors also benefit, since deductions 
that are of no use to them are converted to portfolio-level deductions. 
This presumably enhances the fund’s net return. 
Except for the discussion of monitoring fees, there is almost no 
doctrinal analysis of schemes aimed at reducing the entity-level 
taxation of PIF portfolio holdings. To summarize, academic 
discussion of PIF tax planning is almost exclusively focused on 
management-level tax planning. There is very little discussion on PIF 
portfolio-level planning. Moreover, cross-border tax issues are 
virtually absent from such discussion. 
II. PIFS AND THE MECHANICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
AVOIDANCE 
The purpose of this Part is to consider PIF-portfolio tax planning 
in the international context. Section A explains the motivation for this 
Article’s question, a dataset of documents leaked in a scandal known 
as “LuxLeaks.” An analysis of the leaked documents points to the 
central role played by PIF-controlled entities in international tax 
avoidance. Section B explains the mechanics of PIF portfolio planning 
in the LuxLeaks context. It explains how PIF-controlled MNEs 
eliminate taxation at both the source and residence. Section C 
considers whether there is a broader-than-LuxLeaks argument to be 
made, by surveying additional research pointing to PIFs’ aggressive 
portfolio tax behaviors. 
 
 46. Polsky, Disguised Dividends, supra note 12, at 557–59 (explaining the monitoring 
fees scheme). 
 47. Id. 
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A. PIFs and the LuxLeaks Scandal 
1.  LuxLeaks: Background 
In late 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) made public hundreds of advanced tax agreements 
(ATAs) granted by tax administrators in Luxembourg to multinational 
taxpayers.48 The ATAs were leaked to the ICIJ by two former 
employees at the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Luxembourg office. 
The two employees were prosecuted and convicted for violating 
Luxembourg trade secrecy laws.49 An appeal is currently outstanding. 
ATAs are by no means unique to Luxembourg. In transactions 
where the tax consequences are uncertain, many jurisdictions allow 
taxpayers to ask the tax authorities for a clarifying ruling that secures 
the tax treatment of the transactions.50 However, the Luxembourg 
rulings did much more than simply secure the tax treatment of 
complex transactions. 
A previous article investigated the Luxembourg ruling practices at 
length, and found that by securing a tax ruling in Luxembourg, MNEs 
were able to reduce their tax liabilities in jurisdictions other than 
Luxembourg.51 Specifically, Luxembourg inserted itself as a conduit 
jurisdiction between the source and residence jurisdictions. Instead of 
financing a foreign investment directly, an investor would finance the 
 
 48. See Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2016). 
 49. See LuxLeaks Scandal: Luxembourg Tax Whistleblowers Convicted, BBC NEWS (June 
29, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36662636. 
 50. In the United States, such rulings are known as Private Letter Rulings or PLRs. See 
Rev. Proc. § 2.01, 2016-1 I.R.B. 01 (defining letter ruling). 
 51. See Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (“[A] process in which a national tax administration in one 
jurisdiction, is consciously and systematically assisting taxpayers to avoid taxes in other 
jurisdictions.”); see also INGA HARDECK & PATRICK WITTENSTEIN, ASSESSING THE BENEFITS 
AND COSTS OF TAX HAVEN RULINGS – EVIDENCE FROM THE LUXEMBOURG LEAKS (2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709629 (finding that although MNEs with Luxembourg ATAs 
were able to reduce their global effective tax rate in comparison to MNEs without Luxembourg 
ATAs, they were also subject to higher risk of audit); BIRGIT HUESECKEN & MICHAEL 
OVERESCH, TAX AVOIDANCE THROUGH ADVANCE TAX RULINGS - EVIDENCE FROM THE 
LUXLEAKS FIRMS (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664631 (finding that by engaging in an 
advance tax ruling through Luxembourg, firms have lower effective tax rates compared to non-
ruling firms). 
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investment through Luxembourg.52 As explained at length below, the 
main outcome of Luxembourg’s ruling practices was to generate tax 
planning opportunities that would not have been available had the 
investor financed the investment directly. 
2. PIFs and LuxLeaks 
A previous article addressed Luxembourg practices in issuing 
Advanced Tax Agreements (“ATAs”). The study used a hand-coded a 
sample of 172 ATAs. The documents were selected based on the order 
of appearance in the online database, which is arranged alphabetically 
according to the name of the taxpayer sponsoring the submission.53 
The leaked ATAs were made available by the ICIJ in two batches. 
The first, which included 548 documents issued to 340 MNCs, was 
made public in November of 2014. The second batch of documents—
which was significantly smaller than the first—was made public in 
December of 2014, and included ATAs as well as other documents 
issued to thirty-three MNCs. While the ICIJ states that the first batch 
of leaked ATAs contains 548 documents, the exact number of the 
second batch of documents has not been explicitly stated by the ICIJ. 
Moreover, the 548 figure attached to the first batch is not accurate for 
purposes of the study. Not all of the leaked documents are ATAs. Some 
of the documents consist of tax returns, tax preparation materials and 
other documents contained in PwC’s client files. Such documents are 
excluded from the sample. On the other hand, multiple ATA 
submissions contain previously-issued ATAs as attachments. Attached 
ATAs were coded as separate cases. Some sampling problems that are 
associated with the dataset and the coding process are discussed at-
length elsewhere.54 
Among the variables coded in the project were characteristics of 
the taxpayers who sponsored the rulings. Figure 1, summarizes the 
industry segment of the ATA sponsors. For that purpose, a “sponsor” 
is defined as the ultimate owner of the Luxembourg entity in respect 
 
 52. Marian, supra note 51. 
 53. A caveat is that the dataset only contains ATAs submitted in English. The absolute 
majority of the ATAs, however, are issued in English. During the coding, we came across eleven 
non-English rulings: nine were in French and two were in German (the exclusion of which 
reduces the potential sample size from 183 to 172). Since non-English rulings represent only 
about six-percent of the full sample, we believe a sample of English-only rulings is still suitable 
for a non-generalizable exploratory analysis intended to identify administrative practices. 
 54. Marian, supra note 51. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1728 
of which the ATA is issued. In most cases, ATA submissions explicitly 
stated the identities of the owners. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the central role played by PIFs in 
sponsoring Luxembourg ATAs. Private equity, venture capital, and 
hedge funds (noted in the Figure as “investment pooling vehicles”) 
sponsored about forty-five percent of ATAs, more than any other 
industry segment. Other financial services firms, which may include 
other types of private asset managers, account for sixteen percent of 
the ATAs. 
This finding is quite striking considering current discourse of 
international tax avoidance, especially within the context of the BEPS 
Project. Currently, the discourse is largely dominated by an attempt 
to shut down tax schemes executed by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) from research-dependent industries such as pharmaceuticals 
and high technology.55 Such MNCs are almost unaccounted for in the 
sample. PIFs— which dominate the sample—however, seem to have 
avoided scrutiny in the context of BEPS. This striking finding, which 
demonstrated the central role played by PIFs in tax schemes through 
Luxembourg, was the main motivating factor for this Article. 
 
 55. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 
62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 4 (2015) (“Intellectual property (IP) has become the leading tax-
avoidance vehicle.”). 
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There may be multiple explanations to the large representation of 
PIFs in the LuxLeaks dataset. It is possible that PwC had particular 
expertise in serving PIFs, or that for some reason more PIF ATAs were 
leaked than other ATAs. It is also possible that PIFs have non-tax 
reasons to set up legal structures in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the 
sheer number of PIF-sponsored ATAs suggests a systemic practice of 
international tax avoidance by PIF-controlled entities. 
B. A Simplified Example of a Luxembourg PIF-Portfolio Tax 
Structure 
Given the apparent frequency of PIF’s portfolio-related 
international tax avoidance, it is worth considering the mechanics of 
this phenomenon. To launch a discussion on PIF-Portfolio tax 
planning and its place within the BEPS framework, a simplified 
example is presented. The example is based on a frequent planning 
scheme in the LuxLeaks documents: conduit-financing with 
debt/equity arbitrage. 
Consider the following graphic illustrating basic PIF international 
investment structure. 
 
 
 
The basic structure discussed in Section I.A. is now altered in two 
important ways. First, the structure segregates the LPs into groups 
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based on their tax stances. For example, domestic taxable investors, 
such as individual or corporate taxpayers, will generally be subject to 
tax upon liquidation of their investment in the fund. Tax-exempt 
investors, such as pension funds, governmental entities, and university 
endowments, are—as a rule of thumb—not subject to taxation on 
income from passive investments (that is, investment not actively 
managed by such investors). 
PIFs are structured to accommodate investors’ heterogeneous tax 
preferences. For example, under U.S. tax law, tax-exempt investors 
may face unwelcome tax consequences if they debt-finance 
investments. Profits on debt-financed investments are taxable as 
“Unrelated Business Taxable Income” (UBTI).56 Since the fund itself 
is treated as a partnership—which is mostly transparent for tax 
purposes—any fund-level debt will be allocated to the partners 
(including the tax-exempt partners).57 This may result in UBTI to the 
tax-exempt investors. 
One option to avoid this consequence is to prevent the fund from 
borrowing. This is a serious limitation on the fund operations, which 
is unlikely to be acceptable to the managers or the other (non-exempt) 
partners. In order to address the UBTI issue, and at the same time 
allow the fund to debt finance investments, tax-exempt investors 
would normally invest in the fund through a “blocker” corporation 
organized in a tax haven.58 Any fund borrowing can be done “below” 
the blocker level, and as such, the debt is never treated as incurred by 
the tax-exempt investors (but rather by the blocker corporation). 
Since the blocker corporation is organized in a tax haven, the blocker 
is unlikely to incur any corporate-level taxes. 
Blocker corporations may also be used by foreign investors in 
funds that operate in the United States. For example, foreign investors 
in the United States may have to file U.S. tax returns and pay taxes on 
income that is “effectively connected” with a “United States Trade or 
Business” (“USTOB”).59 If a partnership, such as the fund, is engaged 
in a USTOB, partners are also considered to be so engaged.60 In order 
 
 56. I.R.C. §§ 512, 514 (Supp. 2015). 
 57. I.R.C. §§ 704, 752. 
 58. For a discussion of the use of blocker corporations in fund structuring, see ANDREW 
W. NEEDHAM, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 735), Part VIII.D 
(“Avoiding UBTI/ECI with a Blocker”). 
 59. I.R.C. §§ 871, 882 (2012). 
 60. I.R.C. § 875. 
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to prevent such risk, foreign investors may also use a blocker 
corporation to invest in funds that hold U.S portfolio investments.61 
The second new aspect introduced to the structure, is to add a 
cross-border element into it. That is, we now assume that the portfolio 
investment is located in a jurisdiction that is different from the 
jurisdiction of the LPs, the managers, or both. 
1. The choice of financing structures 
Assume now that the fund identifies an investment opportunity. 
The fund now considers how to finance such an investment. Generally 
speaking, the fund can finance the investment either with equity or 
debt (or a combination of both). The tax consequences will depend 
on such financing. 
Assume the fund finances the portfolio company with equity and 
that the investment is successful. Operating profits generated by the 
portfolio company will likely be taxable at the source jurisdiction. For 
example, if the investment is organized as a local corporate entity, tax 
will be imposed at the local corporate tax rate. Dividends paid from 
the portfolio company to the partners would normally not be 
deductible to the corporation. 
Dividends are unlikely to be taxable to the LPs upon receipt, or 
only lightly taxed. There are several reasons for it: First, most 
jurisdictions in the world would not impose tax on dividends received 
from foreign corporations, if the shareholder holds a required 
“participation” in the subsidiary corporation (usually ten percent of 
the stock value).62 Such systems, known as “territorial jurisdictions,” 
generally only tax profits to the extent earned within their territory.63 
Thus, dividends that flow through the fund to the investors would 
normally not be taxable at the jurisdiction of residence for the 
taxable investors.  
 
 61. Using foreign corporations as vehicles for investment in the United States must take 
into account additional considerations, such as branch taxes. See I.R.C. § 884.   
 62. Most U.S. trading partners have in place international tax laws that exempt all or most 
foreign income earned by domestic corporations. For a recent survey, see Philip Dittmer, A 
Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/global-perspective-territorial-taxation (“Overwhelmingly, 
developed economies are turning to the territorial approach.”). 
 63. For a discussion of common themes of territorial taxation and participation 
exemption, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 466–74 (3d ed. 2010). 
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Second, dividends received by the blocker corporation would 
probably not be taxable to the blocker given that the blocker is 
organized in a tax haven. When the tax-exempt investor withdraws the 
dividends from the blocker, the dividends will not be taxable to those 
investors because of their tax-exempt status. Lastly, even jurisdictions 
that tax profits on a worldwide basis—like the United States—offer 
ample opportunities to reduce taxation on equity returns. For 
example, the United States would not tax foreign earnings until 
repatriated, which enables taxpayers to enjoy deferral.64 This reduces 
the effective rate of taxation on equity returns. Moreover, equity 
returns are many times accorded favorable treatment in the form of 
reduced rate of taxation on “capital gains” or “qualified dividends”.65 
Another issue to consider in the context of dividend distributions 
during the time the investment is held by the PIF is withholding taxes. 
Most countries impose some form of withholding tax on outgoing 
payments, such as dividends, at a gross rate.66 Presumably, dividends 
paid from the portfolio company to the fund are subject to 
withholding taxes at the source jurisdiction. 
However, withholding taxes may be relieved by the operation of 
bilateral tax treaties or other international instruments.67 Under 
common interpretation of tax treaties, the fund itself (assuming it is 
treated as a partnership) is not entitled to enjoy treaty benefits given 
its transparent status, but the investors are. Thus, if the taxable 
investors come from jurisdictions that have a bilateral tax treaty with 
the jurisdiction of the portfolio company, dividend withholding taxes 
may be significantly relieved. Moreover, if the taxable investors and 
the portfolio companies are both from member states of the European 
Union, withholding tax is eliminated under an EU directive known as 
the “Parent Subsidiary Directive.”68 
It is also possible for a fund to claim treaty benefits without 
making the fund itself a taxable entity. Different countries have 
 
 64. For a detailed discussion of deferral and its benefits, see, for example, J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr. et. al., Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 85–110 (2009). 
 65. I.R.C. § 1(h) (Supp. 2014). 
 66. Id. at 510 (“All of the systems here under consideration impose a gross-based 
withholding tax on certain categories of income.”). 
 67. AVI-YONAH, supra note 18, at 74–75 (discussing reduced rates of withholding on 
dividend payments, including through bilateral tax treaties). 
 68. Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States. 
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different entity classification rules for tax purposes.69 It is possible to 
organize the fund as an entity that is transparent from the point of 
view of the country in which it is organized, but as a corporation from 
the point of view of the source country. Thus, when dividends are paid 
to the fund, the source country would view the dividends as paid to a 
corporation entitled to treaty benefits, but the residence jurisdiction 
would view the fund as a transparent entity that is not the beneficial 
owner of the dividends.70 
In order to prevent withholding taxes on payments that are 
attributable to the blocker corporation, such corporations may be 
organized in a tax-haven jurisdiction that enjoys withholding relief 
(for example, UK tax-haven territories such as Gibraltar, which is 
considered part of the UK for purpose of the application of the Parent 
Subsidiary Directive).71 
Upon disposition of the portfolio company, the gain will generally 
not be taxable at the source jurisdiction. The reason is that the gains 
are capital gains, which are generally attributable to the place of the 
residence of the investor.72 If a taxable fund investor is a resident in a 
territorial jurisdiction, such gains will not be taxed to the investors, 
since territorial jurisdictions generally do not tax capital gains from the 
disposition of foreign corporations as long as the participation 
threshold is met.73 Tax-exempt investors will not be subject to taxation 
 
 69. For example, in the United States, the tax-classification of business entities is 
determined by a set of rules promulgated in Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 through -3 (the “check-
the-box regulations”). A foreign entity that is classified as a corporation for tax purposes, under 
the law in the entity’s state of incorporation, may nonetheless be classified as partnership for 
U.S. tax purposes under the check-the-box regulations and vice versa. 
 70. For a discussion of the use of such hybrid entities in the tax treaty context, see Philip 
E. Postlewaite, Stephanie R. Hoffer & Matthew T. Kemp, The Adaptation of U.S. Tax Treaties 
to Changing Business Forms: A Case Study of Hybrid Entities, 34 INT’L TAX J. 33 (2008). 
 71. On June 23, 2016, UK voters decided in a referendum that the UK should leave the 
EU (commonly known as “Brexit”). See UK Votes to Leave EU After Dramatic Night Divides 
Nation, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/
britain-votes-for-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). This may 
have a significant effect on corporate tax planning involving Gibraltar. See Jeannette Neumann, 
In Gibraltar, Brexit Vote Stirs Fears of a Rocky Road, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-gibraltar-brexit-vote-stirs-fears-of-a-rocky-road-1466238118 
(discussing the potential Brexit effects on Gibraltar’s tax attractiveness as an access point into the 
EU market). 
 72. For example, under U.S. law the sale on non-depreciable, non-inventory personal 
property (such a corporate stock), is sourced at the place of the residence of the taxpayer. See 
I.R.C. § 865 (2012). 
 73. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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on disposition gains on account of their tax-exempt status. For taxable 
investors from worldwide jurisdictions, tax will likely be imposed at 
preferred (or deferred, as explained above) capital gains rates. 
To summarize, in the case of equity financing, income from a 
successful investment is taxed once in the form of corporate-tax (and 
potentially a small withholding tax on dividends) at the jurisdiction of 
source. Income is generally not taxed again at the jurisdiction of 
residence,74 either as a result of the operation of the territorial tax 
system, or on account of the fund investors being tax-exempt. Gains 
to taxable investors are generally taxed at the residence jurisdiction at 
preferred capital gains rates upon receipt. 
The consequences are somewhat different if a fund chooses to 
debt-finance the investment. In such a case, a successful portfolio 
company would make interest (rather than dividend) payments to the 
fund (as before, such payments would flow through to the investors). 
Unlike dividends, interest payments are generally deductible to the 
portfolio company and would therefore eliminate much of the taxable 
income at the source jurisdiction.75 
On the other hand, interest receipts from foreign investment are 
generally taxable to the creditors, which, in the case of a PIF, would 
be the investors.76 The result would be that, as in the case of equity 
financing, the income will be taxed once. But this time, the income 
will be taxed to taxable investors at their residence jurisdiction. Tax-
exempt investors would generally be exempt from paying tax on 
interest receipts. This is certainly true of the interest collected by the 
blocker corporation, since the blocker is organized in a tax-haven. This 
means that, in the case of debt-financed investment allocated to a tax-
exempt investor, income is taxed nowhere. 
 
 74. In worldwide jurisdictions, income will be taxed only upon repatriation, since the 
corporate subsidiary is a separate taxpayer. Only upon distributions from the corporate subsidiary 
or upon the sale of its stock, may investors in the fund have income attributable to 
that investment. 
 75. Many countries subject the amount of deductible interest paid to related parties to 
deductibility limitations in order to preserve the tax base. In the United States, such anti earning-
stripping rules are found at I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012). However, it is possible to structure 
deductible payments to the fund in other ways (such as royalties or services fees) that avoid the 
limitation on interest deduction. 
 76. For taxable investors, interest receipts are rarely exempt from taxation. See AULT & 
ARNOLD, supra note 63, at 467 (discussing classes of foreign exempt income and noting that 
foreign passive income such as interest and royalties are generally not exempt from taxation in 
territorial jurisdictions). 
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As in the case of equity financing, upon disposition of the 
investment the capital gains will not be taxable to investors in 
territorial jurisdictions. Also as in the case of equity financing, 
withholding taxes on outgoing interest payments to the fund may be 
relieved under the portfolio company’s local law,77 international law,78 
or by bilateral tax treaties. To summarize, in the case of debt financing, 
income is also taxed once (but only to taxable investors), but this time 
by the investors’ residence jurisdiction. 
The following matrix summarizes the tax results in each of the 
source and residence jurisdictions, in the case of equity or 
debt financing. 
 
Investor/ 
Financing 
Tax burden on 
taxable investors 
(including the 
manager) from 
worldwide 
jurisdictions 
Tax burden on 
tax-exempt 
investors 
Tax burden on 
taxable 
investors from 
territorial 
jurisdictions 
Equity  Source: Yes Source: Yes Source: Yes 
Residence: Yes 
(Low) 
Residence: No Residence: No 
Debt Source: No Source: No Source: No 
Residence: Yes Residence: No Residence:  Yes 
 
Since most PIF investors are tax-exempt, one might expect 
investor-level tax considerations to play a minimal role in PIF tax-
structuring. Presumably, a PIF could simply debt finance investments, 
and extract all profits in the form of interest (or other deductible) 
payments. Interest payments would strip income at the source, while 
at the same time generate little residence taxation due to the investors’ 
tax-exempt status. However, such a financing scheme ignores the fact 
that all PIFs have one very important taxable “investor” who may 
dislike that result—the fund manager. As demonstrated in the matrix 
 
 77. For example, the United States exempts from withholding most U.S.-source interest 
paid to foreign lenders. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c). 
 78. The EU exempts from withholding most interest paid between companies in different 
member states. See Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June, 2003 on a Common System of 
Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between Associated Companies of 
Different Member States, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EU). 
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above, the manager would rather draw its share in the fund profits as 
equity, taxed at capital gain rates, assuming this compensates for the 
loss of source-jurisdiction deduction. If significant parts of the 
manager’s incentive pay are received as interest, the manager would 
face very high tax burdens, which might outweigh the benefits of 
source-deduction. The issue of the managers’ and investors’ tax 
position in respect of portfolio financing is discussed at length below.79 
Taxable investors from territorial jurisdictions share similar preference 
with that of the manager, since interest receipts would be taxable to 
them, while equity receipts would not. 
2. What we learned from LuxLeaks: international tax consequences 
with conduit financing through Luxembourg 
It would be very convenient for the fund and its taxable investors 
(particularly the manager) if the fund could finance investments with 
hybrid financing instruments. A savvy fund manager might attempt to 
structure an instrument that is classified as “debt” under the tax laws 
of the source jurisdiction (where the investment is located), but as 
equity under the tax laws of the jurisdiction of the fund manager (or 
other taxable investors). In this case, payments from the portfolio 
company to the fund would be classified as interest payments under 
the law of the source jurisdiction, making them deductible at the 
source. The receipts by the taxable investors, on the other hand, would 
be classified as dividends under the laws of the residence jurisdiction, 
and will be taxable at preferred rates (or not taxable at all if the taxable 
investors reside in a territorial jurisdiction). Thus, the profits from the 
investment would be taxed at low rates at the residence jurisdiction 
(or not taxed at all). Unfortunately for the fund and its taxable 
investors, such arbitrage opportunities are rarely available, since most 
jurisdictions would uniformly classify the same instrument as either 
debt or equity.80 
This is where Luxembourg enters the planning picture. Instead of 
financing the portfolio investment directly, many funds finance their 
 
 79. See infra Section III.C.2. 
 80. For analysis of debt or equity classification for tax purposes, see DAVID C. GARLOCK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS Ch. 1 (2011). 
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investment through Luxembourg, with a back-to-back financing 
instrument, as depicted in the (much simplified) structure below.81 
 
  
 
As described in detail in previous research,82 the fund could form 
a Luxembourg entity, and finance such entity with an instrument (the 
“top instrument”) that is designed to imitate equity risks and return. 
The Luxembourg entity, in turn, would use the funds received from 
the fund to finance that portfolio investment with a debt instrument. 
This debt instrument would generate deductible interest payments 
that would strip much of the tax base in the source jurisdiction. 
 
 81. Julien Bieber, Gaëlle Auger & Linda Taing, Private Equity Structuring in Luxembourg 
– Key Tax Aspects, TAX PLANNING INT’L REV. 5 (June 5, 2011)  (“Many [Luxembourg entities] 
are financed through so-called ‘hybrid instruments’, which provide for a divergent qualification 
of the instrument at the level of the [Luxembourg entity] and at the level of the investors, in a 
view to optimise the cash repatriation and the overall tax charge.”). For an analysis of an actual 
example of such financing structure, see Marian, supra note 51. 
 82. Marian, supra note 51, at 23–43. 
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Presumably, the interest received in Luxembourg should be 
taxable in Luxembourg to the conduit entity (Luxembourg’s 
corporate tax rate is about twenty-nine percent, national and local 
combined).83 However, as described in the previous research, for a 
small fee, Luxembourg would issue a favorable ATA to the fund. 
Under the ATA, Luxembourg would agree to classify the top 
instrument as “debt” for Luxembourg tax purposes, even though the 
instrument is clearly structured to generate equity-like risks and 
returns.84 As a result, any payment made by the Luxembourg entity to 
the fund would be deductible in Luxembourg. Since the debt 
instrument and the top instrument are structured as back-to-back 
positions, the deduction would completely eliminate the income in 
Luxembourg (except for a small fee discussed below). 
At the jurisdiction of residence of the investors (or the fund 
manager), payments on the top instrument are properly treated as 
equity returns (since the top instrument is substantively an equity 
instrument). If the investors reside in a territorial jurisdiction, the 
result is that the returns are not taxable to the investor. If the investor 
resides in a worldwide jurisdiction, returns are likely accorded 
preferred treatment and taxed at low rates.85 Funds with taxable 
investors from worldwide jurisdictions may also structure their affairs 
to defer tax payments. For example, the top instrument could accrue 
payments for Luxembourg tax purposes but not make actual payments 
until liquidation of the investment. The accrued but unpaid liabilities 
may nonetheless be deductible in Luxembourg under the ATA.86 In 
the residence jurisdiction, however, no tax will be imposed until 
payments are actually made, since most jurisdictions do not impose 
tax on notional equity returns. Tax-exempt investors are not taxed at 
the jurisdiction of residence. 
 
 83. Corporate tax rates are taken from the OECD corporate tax database. OECD, TABLE 
II.1 CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE, http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204 (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2016). 
 84. Marian, supra note 51 at 28–43 (describing the process of debt/equity 
arbitrage manufacturing). 
 85. In the United States, for example, most dividends would qualify for taxation at capital 
gains rates. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012). 
 86. Under certain circumstances accrued liabilities are deductible even if not paid. See 
PETER MOONS, BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG (TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 
971), Part IV.F.4(a) [hereinafter LUXEMBOURG BNA] (“[Future] profit distributions and 
accrued interest, are deductible.”). 
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The result is that the profits from the investment are taxed 
nowhere (or at very low rates at the jurisdiction of residence). By 
issuing an ATA, Luxembourg effectively manufactured an arbitrage 
opportunity that would not have been available had the fund invested 
directly in the source jurisdiction. The implications of this practice are 
profound, and discussed at length elsewhere.87 Such manufactured 
arbitrage opportunities seem to have been utilized by the PIF industry 
more than by any other industry.88 
Luxembourg does not offer such tax avoidance service for free. In 
the ATA, Luxembourg demands that the sponsor of the rulings book 
income in Luxembourg based on a margin. The margin depends on 
the face amount of the back-to-back financing.89 The margin booked 
in Luxembourg is then taxed at the Luxembourg tax rate. The margin 
decreases as the amount of financing increases, much like fees that are 
charged as a percentage of the amount of a bank wire transfer. Hence, 
one may refer to such payment as a fee paid for tax avoidance services. 
The effective tax rate (ETR) on the profits channeled through 
Luxembourg can be calculated as follows:  
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝐸𝐸
𝑖𝑖
 
Where m is the pre-agreed margin, T is the Luxembourg corporate 
tax rate, and i is the return of the portfolio investment. The highest 
margin charged by Luxembourg in the documents exposed by the 
LuxLeaks scandal was 0.25% (for financing through Luxembourg of 
EUR 25 million or less).90 
Assume that a portfolio investment of EUR 25 million generates 
a 10% rate of return. If the 0.25% margin is taxed at the Luxembourg 
29% corporate tax rate, the effective tax rate on the fund investment 
would be: 
 
 
 87. Marian, supra note 51, at 45–50 (discussing the implications of 
arbitrage manufacturing). 
 88. See supra Figure 1. 
 89. Marian, supra note 51 (discussing margin determination). 
 90. See id. (discussing profits margins typically taxable in Luxembourg). 
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0.0025 ∙ 0.290.1 = 0.725% 
 By securing a tax ruling through Luxembourg, the fund is thus 
able to avoid source taxation in the jurisdiction where income is 
generated (for comparison purposes, note that the unweighted 
average statutory corporate tax rate in OECD countries was about 
25.5% in 2010, while the average effective tax rate for 2008 was about 
23.3%).91 Instead, the fund is burdened by an absurdly low effective 
source tax rate of 0.725%. If the taxable investors reside in a territorial 
jurisdiction, no additional tax is imposed. If the taxable investors 
reside in a worldwide jurisdiction (like the managers), they will be 
taxed at preferred rates on equity returns, on a deferred basis. Tax-
exempt investors do not suffer any additional tax burden. 
C. Are PIF-Controlled MNEs More Tax Aggressive than Other 
MNEs? 
The discussion of the LuxLeaks scandal provides anecdotal 
evidence that PIF-controlled entities engage in aggressive 
international tax avoidance. PIF-controlled MNEs account for almost 
half of the LuxLeaks dataset. There is additional evidence suggesting 
that PIF-controlled MNEs are more tax-aggressive when compared 
with MNEs not controlled by PIFs. 
Two studies questioned whether PIF-controlled entities are more 
aggressive in their tax behavior, compared with similar non-PIF-
controlled entities. Badertscher et al. “compares the income tax 
avoidance of management-owned and [private equity]-backed private 
firms.”92 Using a sample of private firms with public debt, they 
compare PIF-backed firms with management-owned firms on several 
measures of corporate tax-avoidance.93 They find that management-
owned firms “avoid significantly less income tax than [private equity]-
backed firms.”94 
 
 91. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743,  INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2014). 
 92. Badertscher et al., supra note 22, at 229. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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Cheng et al.,95 take a different methodological approach. Using a 
sample of hedge-fund “activist events,” they consider whether hedge-
fund activism causes hedge-fund portfolio companies to change their 
tax behavior.96 When compared with a control group of non-hedge-
fund-backed firms, they find that “target firms have lower tax 
avoidance levels than control firms before hedge fund intervention.”97 
The implication is that active fund managers seem to pursue aggressive 
tax planning for their portfolio holdings.98 
The empirical studies noted above use several financial measures 
as proxies for the level of firms’ tax avoidance. Most such measures do 
not necessarily measure tax avoidance in the international context. 
However, some of the findings do suggest that PIF-controlled MNEs 
make extensive use of cross-border tax strategies. For example, 
Badertscher et al. examines the use of tax-haven subsidiaries as a 
measure for the level of tax avoidance, and indeed finds that “[non-
PIF-owned] firms have significantly fewer subsidiaries in tax haven 
countries than PE-backed private firms.”99 
To summarize, although research on PIF-portfolio planning is in 
its infancy, current studies strongly suggest that PIF-controlled 
companies are more aggressive in their tax planning than other 
companies. The anecdotal evidence stemming from the LuxLeaks 
research complements and supports such findings, particularly in the 
international tax context. 
III. WHAT MAKES PIF-CONTROLLED MNES SUCCESSFUL 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDERS? 
Thus far the Article explained PIF international portfolio tax 
planning and argued that PIF-controlled MNEs may reasonably be 
perceived to be more tax-aggressive than other MNEs, particularly in 
the international context. This Part considers possible explanations for 
this phenomenon. Section A examines some of the explanations 
suggested in previous studies. Section B offers new explanations 
associated with the PIF operating model.  
 
 95. Supra note 22. 
 96. Id. at 1495–96. 
 97. Id. at 1495. 
 98. See id. at 1495–96. 
 99. Badertscher, et al., supra note 22, at 246. 
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A. Existing Explanations for Tax Avoidance by PIF-Controlled 
MNEs 
Existing literature provides several possible explanations for why 
PIF-backed MNEs are more tax aggressive than other MNEs. 
1.  Separation of ownership and control 
Badertscher et al. hypothesizes that ownership structures may have 
an effect on firms’ tax strategies.100 Particularly, they suggest that 
“when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are 
concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these owner-
managers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest 
in risky projects.”101 Since tax-avoidance is a risky activity, they expect 
that “firms with more highly concentrated ownership and control . . . 
avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership 
and control.”102 
This explanation makes sense in the specific context of Badertscher 
et al. which compares private equity-backed-firms with private firms 
that are controlled by management. But such a particular comparison 
lacks explanatory power when comparing private equity-backed firms 
with publicly traded firms where, in many instances, ownership and 
control are also separated. 
2. PIFs’ tax planning expertise 
Another explanation for PIFs’ portfolio tax planning, offered by 
Badertscher et al. concerns PIF management tax expertise. Since fund 
managers tend to “retain authority over tax planning,”103 they “have 
substantial experience in owning and monitoring a broad set of 
portfolio companies and their tax strategies.”104 As a result, they 
predict that PIFs “have the ability to generate economies of scale and 
scope for tax avoidance at PE-backed firms.”105 In other words, the 
marginal tax planning costs for PIF-controlled firms are lower than 
 
 100. Id. at 233 (“In particular, we examine whether firms with more concentrated 
ownership and control avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership 
and control.”). 
 101. Id. at 229. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 234. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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those of other firms, which may explain some of the difference in 
tax behavior. 
This explanation seems sensible in the context of Badertscher et 
al.’s narrow comparison of PIFs to privately held, management-owned 
firms. It is not surprising to find that the cost of tax planning for PIFs 
is lower than those of privately owned firms. However, there is little 
reason to expect that PIF managers apply any more expertise in tax 
planning, compared with tax managers of large multinational firms. 
Such firms are not part of Badertscher et al.’s sample. MNEs creative 
tax planning is well-documented. There is no evidence suggesting that 
PIF managers are any better tax planners than the tax directors of 
large MNEs. 
Moreover, most PIFs have rather small internal tax operations. 
Most tax planning work is outsourced to accounting firms and law 
firms. On the other hand, large MNEs can handle most tax planning 
activity in-house. The tax department at General Electric was reported 
at one point to be almost 1,000 strong.106 Under such circumstances, 
it is difficult to believe that the marginal cost of PIFs tax planning is 
lower than the marginal cost of any sophisticated large MNE. 
3. PIFs as experts in value creation 
Cheng et. al. suggest a different explanation for why PIF-
controlled entities exhibit particularly aggressive tax behavior. They 
assert that “hedge funds’ informed monitoring is associated with 
improvements in target firms’ tax efficiencies.”107 PIFs are expert at 
identifying firm inefficiencies. If a manager identifies an unexploited 
tax-planning opportunity in one of its portfolio companies, the 
manager will make sure the company takes advantage of 
that opportunity. 
This explanation makes sense, but again does not account for the 
sophistication of tax professionals at non-PIF-controlled firms. It is 
difficult to imagine that tax directors at large MNEs will fail to identify 
tax-minimizing opportunities. Rather, as explained below,108 when 
similar opportunities are available to both PIF and non-PIF controlled 
 
 106. Jeff Gerth, GE’s Taxes: A Case Study, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2011/04/04/ges-taxes-a-case-study (“About 20 years ago, GE’s tax 
employees totaled a few hundred and were decentralized. Today, there are almost 1,000.”). 
 107. Cheng et al., supra note 22, at 1496. 
 108. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1744 
firms, non-PIF controlled firms may face certain constraints that 
prevent them from taking advantage of such opportunities. 
B. PIFs Business Model and International Tax Avoidance 
While existing explanations for the aggressive nature of PIF-
backed companies’ tax behavior may offer some insights, they present 
two shortcomings. First, they do not identify behaviors that are more 
likely to occur in PIF-backed firms than in large MNEs. Tax expertise, 
low cost of tax planning, and the separation of ownership and control 
all exhibit themselves in many MNEs, not only in PIF-backed MNEs. 
It is therefore unclear whether such explanations account for PIFs’ 
seemingly unique portfolio tax behavior. A second shortcoming of 
such explanations is that they do not consider the unique operational 
structure of PIFs, and whether that structure has some bearing on PIF 
portfolio tax behavior. This Section, therefore, offers additional 
explanations to PIF-backed MNEs tax behavior, taking into account 
the international context in which PIFs operate. It concludes that PIF-
backed firms face fewer constraints on their international tax planning, 
compared with non-PIF-backed firms. 
1.  Short investment horizon 
Unlike other MNEs, PIFs’ investments are limited in durations by 
the very terms of PIFs’ operative agreements. As explained above, it is 
unlikely that a PIF will hold an investment for a period longer than 
five to seven years.109 A short-term investment horizon may have 
several effects on PIFs’ tax behavior. 
To begin with, the limited investment term puts much pressure on 
PIF managers to turn profits in a relatively short period of time. This 
may induce an aggressive tax stance to support the quick generation 
of net profits. Moreover, the PIF management, which guides the 
portfolio firm tax planning, may not be deterred by potential tax 
audits. Unlike tax managers in other MNEs, it is likely that by the time 
tax assessments against the portfolio-firm materialize, the PIF will 
have long-since disposed of the portfolio firm. PIF managers are 
unlikely to have to face tax authorities. At most, they will face demands 
from the buyer of the portfolio company to indemnify it for any tax-
associated losses. Of course, such tax risk should normally be priced 
 
 109. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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into a transaction in which a PIF disposes of its investment. But pricing 
an unknown tax risk is an extremely difficult undertaking.   
A short investment horizon may also alleviate the effect of 
reputational constraints. In 2015, Walgreens’ public image suffered 
gravely after it was announced that the company considered changing 
its tax residence to the U.K. in a move intended to avoid U.S. taxes.110 
Eventually, it seems that public relation considerations pushed 
Walgreens to scrap its tax plan.111 Walgreens had to consider the fact 
that most of its stores are in the United States and a public relations 
disaster might affect long term relations with its customers. Indeed, 
several studies suggest that reputational considerations may constrain 
aggressive firm-level tax planning.112 
PIFs are probably less sensitive to such long term reputational 
effects. A portfolio company held by a PIF will be disposed of within 
a short period. Any negative reputational effects of the company are 
likely to burden the next owner of the company, not the PIF. A small 
PIF-portfolio company is unlikely to appear on the radar of public 
political consciousness during this short ownership period. Further, 
PIF managers often reside in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction 
of the investment and thus may not be completely sensitive to political 
pressure originating in the jurisdiction. These special circumstances 
suggest that PIF managers are less likely to take into account long-
term reputational effects of aggressive tax planning. 
Investment horizons have also been found to affect investors’ 
oversight over corporate tax planning. One study found “that firms 
with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership exhibit 
significantly lower levels of tax avoidance.”113 In PIFs, no investor 
owns a portfolio company for the long term, and hence, such 
constraints on tax avoidance are absent. 
Finally, short investment horizons may have an additional effect 
on PIF-portfolio tax planning. A firm’s long term operation within a 
jurisdiction is affected by the financial health of the jurisdiction. Firms 
 
 110. Bruce Japsen, Walgreens Says HQ Won’t Leave U.S., Never Intended ‘Inversion’, 
FORBES (May 28, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/05/
28/walgreens-says-hq-wont-leave-u-s-never-intended-inversion/#68c44c754381. 
 111. Alexander C. Kaufman, How Americans Scared Walgreens Out Of A $4 Billion Tax 
Dodge, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/08/07/walgreens-tax-inversion_n_5655934.html. 
 112. See supra note 23 and sources cited therein. 
 113. Khurana & Moser, supra note 27, at 113. 
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may have interest in operating in an environment of legal stability, 
developed infrastructure, and skilled labor force.114 Because of this, a 
firm may be willing to share some of the burden associated with 
government outlays that finance public goods. 
However, due to short investment horizon, PIF-controlled 
entities are less likely to be constrained by such considerations. Any 
benefits of successful tax planning quickly materialize. The cost of tax 
avoidance to the jurisdiction in which the PIF-backed investment 
operates is unlikely to be felt by the PIF owners and managers, who 
will have disposed of the investment long before such long-term 
effects take root. 
2. Aggressive tax personalities 
Recent research suggests that “executives who appear willing to 
push the envelope for personal tax savings appear to do the same at 
the firms they manage.”115 Chyz identifies a sample of executives who 
manipulatively exercised stock options for personal tax gains and 
classifies such executives as “suspect” of aggressive tax personalities.116 
He then compares firms on several measures of firm-level tax 
avoidance, in times when suspect executives were present versus times 
when they were not.117 Chyz finds “that suspect executive presence is 
positively associated with tax sheltering”118 at the firm level. 
Since PIF fund managers retain control of portfolio firms’ tax 
decisions, it is reasonable to expect that their personal tax tendencies 
may affect their portfolio firms’ tax behavior. There is no study that 
looks at the tax aggressiveness of fund managers in particular. 
However, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence showing that fund 
managers frequently take particularly aggressive tax positions. This is 
most evident in the context of management fee waivers, where 
multiple fund managers regularly took the position that their waived 
fee allocations should be taxed at the capital gains rate rather than at 
ordinary income rates. The mechanics of such arrangements are 
 
 114. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 115. James A. Chyz, Personally Tax Aggressive Executives and Corporate Tax Sheltering, 56 
J. ACCT. & ECON. 311, 311 (2013). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 315–18. 
 118. Id. at 322. 
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complex.119 Suffice it to say that capital gain rates are usually reserved 
for risky returns, while allocations on account of fee waivers often 
came close to being guaranteed payments.120 Guaranteed payments 
from a partnership (the fund), to the partner (the manager), are taxed 
at ordinary rates.121 Such aggressive tax planning led commentators to 
question whether fee waiver strategies pass muster under tax law,122 
and it was eventually shut down.123 
If fund managers represent a class of aggressive tax personalities, 
then Chyz’s study gives us reason to believe that such aggressive 
behavior will trickle down to the funds’ portfolio companies. This 
effect is exacerbated by the fact that fund managers’ tax interests 
dictate the funds’ portfolio planning.124 Given that most investors are 
tax-exempt, fund managers are unlikely to be constrained by investors 
with adversarial tax considerations. 
3. Opacity 
A final issue that may contribute to PIF aggressive portfolio tax 
planning is the opacity with which they operate. Most PIFs are not 
publicly traded, and as such are not subject to public disclosure 
requirements. At most, publicly listed PIF portfolio companies are 
subject to disclosure requirements in their own capacity. There is no 
consolidated disclosure of PIF operations. This differs from any 
publicly traded MNE, which must include consolidated disclosure of 
its global financial outcomes.125 Previous research shows that there is 
a negative correlation between the quality of public disclosure and the 
extent of aggressive tax behavior.126 Opacity also further diminishes 
 
 119. For a discussion of fee waivers, see Polsky, Fee Conversions, supra note 11. 
 120. Id. at 766 (arguing that “a priority allocation of quarterly net gain is analogous to the 
gross income allocation that was treated as a section 707(c) guaranteed payment . . . .”). 
 121. I.R.C. § 707 (2012). 
 122. See supra note 44. 
 123. Recent regulation promulgated under I.R.C. § 707 have shut down the most 
aggressive forms of fee-waiver tax planning. Supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 125. Publicly traded corporations report their worldwide financial results on a consolidated 
basis. Moreover, under Action 13 of the BEPS Project, certain multinational entities will be 
required to report certain worldwide information to tax authorities. See discussion infra 
Section IV.B. 
 126. See generally Ole-Kristian Hope, Mark (Shuai) Ma & Wayne B. Thomas, Tax 
Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 170 (2013) (finding that 
managers perceive opacity in geographical reporting as masking tax aggressive behavior). 
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the constraints on tax planning that may be imposed by reputational 
considerations. To summarize, the opacity in which PIFs operate may 
enable aggressive tax planning to take root.127 
Moreover, PIFs themselves are rarely taxable entities. Most PIFs 
are organized as partnerships, and, as such, are not subject to taxation 
at the entity level. This, in turn, may obscure the role of PIFs in driving 
tax behavior.  
IV. PIFS’ INVESTOR BASE AND INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE 
The previous Part explained the role of the PIF business model in 
international tax avoidance. This Part turns the focus to the identity 
of PIF investors. Many of the limited partners in PIFs are tax-exempt 
investors.128 Such investors include pension funds, sovereign wealth 
funds, university endowments, and other institutions not subject to 
taxation on passive investments. This Part argues that the presence of 
non-taxable investors significantly affects PIFs’ tax behavior in two 
important ways. First, the presence of non-taxable investors 
significantly affects funds’ portfolio-level tax planning. The essential 
argument is that taxable investors may have different tax interests 
compared with that of the fund manager, and that such interest may 
mitigate aggressive tax planning. Such constraint is largely eliminated 
when most investors are tax-exempt. In the international context this 
analysis is particularly potent because taxable investors may become 
tax-exempt in a cross-border transaction if they come from territorial 
jurisdictions. Thus, any tax effect associated with a large tax-exempt 
investor base is amplified in the cross-border context.  Second, a large 
tax-exempt investor base suggests that income that is not taxed at the 
source, is also not taxed at the residence.  
 
 127. Opacity may be mitigated when PIF holds a publically traded portfolio investment, 
or when a disposition is made through an IPO. But in the case of an IPO, disclosure will only 
happen with connection of the disposition. Tax planning during the holding period 
remain opaque. 
 128. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 13 (“many LPs in private equity firms are tax exempt, 
such as pension funds and university endowments”); see also Polksy, Compendium, supra note 1, 
at 616 (“[T]he limited partners generally do not pay U.S. taxes, either because they are tax 
exempt or foreign.”). 
1715 The Other Eighty Percent 
 1749 
A. Prior Analysis of the Importance of Non-taxable LPs to PIFs’ 
Tax Planning 
The interplay between the fund and its non-taxable investors has 
been subject to some analysis.129 For example, if the fund managers 
were to take all their profits from the fund as compensatory fees, the 
managers would be taxed immediately at ordinary tax rates. Instead, 
by taking their economic interest in the fund as a profits interest (the 
“carried interest”), managers can defer gain recognition until the 
fund’s liquidation, at which time the gain is taxed at preferential capital 
gains rates. While this result is beneficial to the fund managers, it may 
be detrimental to taxable fund investors. This is because, had the 
managers opted to take the bulk of their compensation as 
management fees, those fees would be deductible, flowing through to 
the investors. Taxable investors value deductions and may be upset 
with fund managers who deny them of those tax benefits. However, 
tax-exempt investors have no use for tax deductions. When most LPs 
in a PIF are tax-exempt, investors have no adverse tax interest to that 
of the managers’ use of carried interest. In fact, the investors probably 
share in the managers’ benefit in the form of lower fees paid to 
the managers.130 
The analysis above concerns fund-level planning that benefits the 
manager without harming other investors. There is very little analysis 
of portfolio-level tax planning in the presence of tax-exempt investors. 
One exception to this dearth of literature is Gregg Polsky’s analysis of 
fund “monitoring fees.”131 Fund managers typically charge a two 
percent annual fee from the fund.132 This fee is deductible by the fund 
and flows through to the limited partners. However, such deductions 
are of little use to the tax-exempt limited partners. 
In order to prevent the deduction from going to waste,133 fund 
managers have engaged in a type of planning that converts portfolio 
companies’ distributions into “monitoring fees.”134 PIFs may charge 
 
 129. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1. 
 130. See Sanchirico, supra note 1, at 1151–52 (describing how tax-exempt investors share 
their benefits in the form of lower management compensation). 
 131. Polsky, Compendium, supra note 1, at 622–25 (discussing monitoring fees). 
      132. Supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 133. Id. at 622 (“If there’s anything a tax lawyer hates, it’s to see a perfectly good 
deduction go to waste.”). 
 134. For a discussion of management fee conversions, see Polsky, Disguised Dividends, 
supra note 12. 
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their portfolio companies certain “monitoring fees” for 
“management” and other services provided by the fund to the 
companies. Presumably, under a typical fund economic deal, such fees 
would be paid to the fund investors, pro-rata to their capital 
contributions to the fund, as a return on investment. Instead, under 
monitoring fee schemes, the monitoring fees are paid to the fund 
managers to offset the two percent management fees otherwise paid 
by the fund to the managers. Thus, the economic deal is not changed 
(the investors lose the monitoring fees, but their management fee 
liability is reduced by the same amount). However, a nondeductible 
fund-level management fee is now converted to deductible fees paid 
by the portfolio companies to the fund manager. Therefore, the fund 
managers suffer no tax detriment (both the management fees and the 
monitoring fees are taxable to the fund managers at ordinary rates), 
but the after-tax return on investment is increased. 
B. Tax-exempt Investors in the Context of International Portfolio-
Level Tax Planning 
The same game played with monitoring fees can efficiently be 
recreated in the context of international tax planning. The idea is to 
generate portfolio level deductions without creating additional 
inclusions to investors or the fund managers. But in the context of the 
tax rules applicable to cross-border transactions, this can be done to a 
much greater extent than in the context of monitoring fees. 
Monitoring fees convert a two percent management fee payment into 
a portfolio-level deduction. International tax rules can do the same to 
the bulk of a fund’s profits. 
Consider, for example, a PIF with taxable investors from a 
territorial jurisdiction investing in another jurisdiction. Taxable 
investors would rather withdraw their return from the fund as equity, 
which will not be taxable in their home jurisdiction. For foreign equity 
returns purposes, such investors are effectively tax-exempt. This 
change of status from taxable to non-taxable return is triggered by the 
international nature of PIF investment and would not happen in a 
purely domestic context. Taxable investors who would invest in their 
own jurisdiction would be taxed in their own jurisdiction. 
Payments that represent equity returns (such as dividends or 
distributions that are treated as return on capital), however, are not 
deductible to the portfolio companies. In effect, taxable investors are 
faced with a choice between avoiding tax at the source jurisdiction 
(debt financing) or at the residence jurisdiction (equity financing). If 
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the source jurisdiction tax rate is higher than the rate at residence, a 
taxable investor would rather avoid taxation at the source by financing 
with debt. PIF may seek to improve such outcome by turning equity 
returns to portfolio-level deductible expenses through 
debt/equity arbitrage.  
If investors are “true” tax-exempt investors (meaning, the 
exemption is not conditioned on the investment being classified as an 
equity interest), such planning is, in theory, made even easier. The 
fund could simply charge the bulk of the return from the portfolio 
company as deductible payments (such as interest, royalties or service 
fee payments). This deduction would eliminate much of the portfolio-
level tax base, but will not be taxed to the investors since they are tax-
exempt. If the fund organizes its affairs wisely, the deduction would 
also avoid any withholding taxes at the jurisdiction of source. Many 
countries exempt certain types of deductible payments from 
withholding tax (in particular withholding on interest payments or 
payments of royalties are frequently exempt).135 
This brings up a second order question: if “most” PIF investors 
are tax-exempt, why would funds go through the trouble of engaging 
in aggressive schemes such as the ones exposed by LuxLeaks? Why not 
just finance investments with debt? Why not simply charge portfolio-
companies intercompany deductible payments? Why does it seem that 
the interest of some taxable investors dictates portfolio level planning? 
The answers to these questions may be related to the fact that the 
most significant taxable investor of any fund is also managing the fund. 
The fund manager’s carried interest is probably the largest taxable 
fund interest (twenty percent of the fund profits).136 The fund 
manager is able to push such planning particularly because such tax 
scheme has no effect on the investor-level outcome of tax-exempts or 
taxable investors from territorial jurisdictions (these investors do not 
care whether investment return is classified as debt or equity return). 
If the fund had a majority of taxable investors, it is not at all clear 
that all taxable investors would approve of such debt/equity 
 
 135. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text (discussing relief on withholding taxes 
on interest payments). Withholding on royalties is also many times relived. For example, the 
OECD model tax treaty recommends no withholding on royalties in most cases. See OECD 
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Art. 
12(1) (2010). Inter-EU royalties and interest payments are also relieved from withholding under 
an EU directive. See Council Directive 2003/49/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EU). 
 136. Supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1752 
conversions. Different taxable investors have different tax positions 
and may be affected differently by portfolio-level planning.137 
Consider, for example, a taxable investor who has loss carryovers.138 
This investor may prefer receiving interest returns, which will be offset 
by the investor’s loss carryovers, rather than equity returns taxed to 
the investor at capital gains rates. As another example, consider a 
taxable U.S. corporate investor. It is not clear whether such investor 
would rather receive interest or dividends from the portfolio company 
because both interest and dividends may be taxable to the corporate 
investor at the thirty-five percent corporate tax rate. Interest would be 
deductible at the portfolio-company level, while dividends would not. 
On the other hand, in some instances, dividends from foreign 
companies may carry with them foreign tax credit to be used against 
the investor’s U.S. tax liability.139 A fund manager, in his or her 
individual capacity, cannot use such credits. This creates an adverse tax 
interest to that of the corporate investor. The bottom line is that in 
the presence of taxable investors, the fund managers must navigate 
through potentially adverse investor-level tax interests, which are 
affected directly by portfolio-level tax planning. However, that 
constraint is largely eliminated when most investors are tax-exempt. 
C. Assessing the Size of PIFs’ Tax-exempt Investor Base 
Arguments about the effect of tax-exempt holdings in PIFs rely 
on the assumption that most PIF investors are tax-exempt. 
Surprisingly, there is very little current research on the tax interests of 
PIF investors. In 2006, Professor David Weisbach estimated that 
about thirty-eight percent of private equity investors in the United 
States were taxable investors (and as a consequence, up to sixty-two 
percent are tax exempt).140 A recent article that explored the size of 
tax-exempt investors in U.S. corporations assumed, for 
methodological purposes, that seventy-five percent of PIF investors 
 
 137. Omri Marian, Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulation, 48 MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 1, 10–13 (2014) (discussing investors’ heterogeneous tax preferences). 
 138. Taxpayer may, under certain circumstances, carry forward past losses and use them to 
offset future taxable gains. See I.R.C. § 172 (Supp. 2014). 
 139. See I.R.C. § 902 (2012). 
 140. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interest in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
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are tax-exempt, but did not actually investigate the matter.141 
Executing a full-blown research project to accurately measure actual 
investors’ holdings in non-public entities is methodologically complex 
and certainly beyond the scope of a symposium article.142 Instead, this 
Section uses recent data to try to provide a reasonable assessment of 
the current level of tax-exempt holdings (in terms of capital 
investment) in both U.S. and European PIFs.   
For European PIFs, data is available online from Invest Europe 
(formerly known as the European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association, or EVCA). Invest Europe publishes annual fundraising 
reports that include, among others, the sectors of investors 
committing capital European PIFs. Full data is available on Invest 
Europe’s website for years 2007 to 2015.143 
For purposes of this analysis the following investor categories in 
the EVCA data are classified as tax-exempt investors: Endowment and 
Foundations, Government Agencies, Pension Funds, and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds. Each of these investors are regularly treated as tax-
exempt under the laws of most developed jurisdictions. The following 
categories of investors are treated as taxable for purposes of this 
analysis: Banks, Corporate Investors, Insurance Companies, and 
Private Individuals. For most years, categories that were clearly 
categorized as exempt or taxable account for about two thirds of all 
PIF investors. 
The methodological difficulty arises in the context of the 
remaining investor categories, whose tax status is unclear 
(“unclassified categories”). These investor categories include Capital 
Markets, Family Offices, Other Asset Managers, and an Unclassified 
category. The reason for the inclusion of Other Asset Managers in this 
category is that many of them may be investment intermediaries 
 
 141. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. 
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 933 (2016). 
 142. For a recent paper that identifies the owners of pass-through entities in the United 
States, see Michael Cooper et. al., Business in the United States: Who Owns it and How Much Tax 
Do They Pay?, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Working Paper No. 21651, 2015). They find 
that about 10.9% of U.S. partnerships’ income is accrued to tax-exempt and foreign taxpayers. 
There is good reason to assume that the share of tax-exempt investors in PIF partnerships is 
much larger. Moreover, tax-exempt and foreign partners that invest in U.S. PIFs generally invest 
through foreign vehicles which are not captured by their study. 
 143. The data is available at http://www.investeurope.eu/research/activity-data/annual-
activity-statistics/. 
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themselves, or funds of funds (PIFs that invest in other PIFs).144 
Family Offices are included in this category because family offices, at 
many times, invest through non-taxable trusts that enable their 
beneficiaries to avoid or substantially defer gain recognition. Capital 
Markets are included in this category because Invest Europe does not 
provide a definition for that category of investors, and it is therefore 
not clear whether such investors should be counted as taxable 
or nontaxable. 
In order to assess the size of the ratio of taxable to nontaxable 
investors in the unclassified category, the analysis takes two 
approaches. One is to assume that the same ratio of 
taxable/nontaxable investors in the classified categories applies to the 
non-classified categories. This approach is reasonable, since many of 
the unclassified categories of investors are private investment pooling 
vehicles themselves (such as funds of funds or asset managers). It is 
reasonable to expect similar investment patterns are shared across 
similar types of private investment vehicles. The alternative 
approach—following Rosenthal & Austin’s estimation of taxable 
holdings in U.S. equities held through pass-through entities145—is to 
simply assume that half are taxable and half are not.146 The fifty-fifty 
assumption is more conservative than the methodology used by 
Rosenthal & Austin, who, for purposes of their study, assumed that 
seventy-five percent of PIF investors are tax-exempt.147 The two 
methods thus create a range of outcomes, which is summarized in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 144. Weisbach counts funds of funds as “taxable” in his estimation. This causes Weisbach 
to overestimate the size of the taxable sector since many funds of funds’ investors are also 
tax exempt. 
 145. Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 141. 
 146. Id. at app. 2. 
 147. Id. at 934, Table A2. 
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The dark line in Figure 1 represents an estimation based on 
assigning the unclassified category with the same ratio of taxable to 
nontaxable investors in the known categories. The lighter line shows 
the estimated size of the nontaxable investor base based on a fifty-fifty 
assignment of taxable to nontaxable investors in the 
unknown category. 
Save for a drop in nontaxable investment following the 2008 
financial crash, it seems that the size on the nontaxable sector of PIF 
investors regularly outweighs the size of the taxable sectors, and that 
the size of the nontaxable sector gradually increases over time. For 
2015, nontaxable investors account for about sixty-one to seventy-one 
percent of all PIF investors. Even with these striking figures, the 
relative investment by tax-exempt investors to that of taxable investors 
is probably understated. The reason is that, as explained above, taxable 
investors from territorial jurisdictions are probably tax-exempt with 
respect to returns from PIF investment, since the returns are drawn as 
capital gains or other types of equity returns.148 
 
 148. Indeed, at least in the United States, tax-exempt and foreign LP investors seem to 
withdraw most of their partnership income in the form of capital gains. See Cooper et. al., supra 
note 142, at 38, Figure 8.B. 
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A similar method is applied to U.S. PIFs. Unfortunately, U.S. data 
is not as freely available as in Europe. For purposes of this analysis, 
data for the U.S. is derived from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Private Funds Statistics Reports.149 Since 2012, 
private fund managers are required to report certain information to 
the SEC.150 Such information includes the classes of investors in 
privately managed funds. The information is available on the SEC’s 
website at the Division of Investment Management page. Full data is 
available beginning with the first quarter of 2013.151 
For most periods, just under seventy percent of all investors in 
U.S. PIFs can be reasonably classified as taxable or tax-exempt, with a 
reasonable level of confidence. The following investor categories are 
classified as tax-exempt for purposes of the U.S. analysis: Pension 
Plans, State/Municipal Pension Plans, Non-Profits, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, Non-U.S. Individuals, Unknown non-U.S. Investors, SEC-
Registered Investment Companies, and State/Municipal Government 
Entities. Foreign investors are classified as tax-exempt, because such 
investors many times come from territorial jurisdiction, and are rarely 
taxable in the U.S. on passive income earned in the United States.152 
SEC-registered companies are classified as nontaxable because such 
entities are frequently treated as RICs (“Regulated Investment 
Companies”) under the Internal Revenue Code.153 RICs are accorded 
beneficial tax treatment that generally eliminates RIC-level taxation.154 
 
 149. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Private Funds Statistics Third Calendar 
Quarter 2015, Feb. 16, 2016. 
 150. For a discussion of these recent disclosure requirements, see, Chris William 
Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 TAX L. 
REV. 207, 264–65 (2015). 
 151. See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Inv. Mgmt., supra note 149, at 2 n.2, (“The 
Commission began receiving Form PF filings from Large Hedge Fund Advisers in July 2012. A 
full data set was not received until March 2013.”). 
 152. Most industrialized jurisdictions employ some form of territorial taxation. See Philip 
Dittmer, A Global Perspective On Territorial Taxation, TAX FOUND. Special Report No. 202, 
Aug. 10, 2012, at 3 (Investment income sourced in the United States is rarely taxable to foreign 
investors); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 18, at 68 (discussing how little revenue is collected from 
foreign investment income in the United States, concluding that the exceptions for withholding 
tax on investment income “overshadow the rule itself”). 
 153. I.R.C. §§ 851–855 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 154. RICs are required to pay most of their earnings as dividends, and may deduct 
dividends paid. This effectively eliminates most of the entity-level taxable income. While RIC 
shareholders may be taxable, an RIC’s ownership is dispersed (for example, mutual funds are 
RICs), and the tax interests of particular RIC holders are unlikely to affect the tax behavior of 
an investment fund held by the RIC. 
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The following U.S. investor categories were treated as taxable for 
purposes of the analysis: U.S. Individuals, Insurance Companies, 
Banking/Thrift Institutions, and Broker-Dealers. 
The following investor categories are regarded as unclassified for 
purposes of the analysis: Private Funds and Other. The same 
methodology used in the context of European PIFs is applied with 
respect to unclassified investors in U.S. PIFs. The results are 
summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
The investor base in U.S. PIFs is clearly dominated, at least in 
recent years, by tax-exempt investors. For the third quarter of 2015, 
between sixty-six and seventy-three percent of investment was made 
by tax-exempt investors. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the results presented herein are 
merely estimates, they seem reasonable. They are consistent with 
previous estimates by Weisbach.155 They are also similar to a recent 
estimate of tax-exempt investment holdings by Rosenthal & Austin, 
who estimate that only 24.2% of U.S. equities are held in 
taxable accounts.156 
 
 155. Supra note 140, at 722. 
 156. Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 141, at 923. 
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
Figure 2 - Size of Tax-Exempt Investor Base in U.S. PIFs
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1758 
To summarize, this Section estimated that about two thirds of PIF 
investors are tax-exempt. This implies that PIF portfolio-level 
planning may be affected by the absence of taxable investors, whose 
investor-level tax interests may conflict with the interest of the fund 
manager. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that in the cross-border 
context, otherwise taxable investors are functionally tax-exempt. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that most earnings by PIFs are not 
taxed at the jurisdiction of residence. Combined with the fact that 
PIF-controlled entities are lightly taxed at the source jurisdictions, the 
inevitable conclusion is that most income earned by PIF investors 
from cross-border investment is simply never taxed.   
V. ADDRESSING PIFS INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 
This Article has thus far established that PIF-controlled MNEs 
seem to be particularly aggressive in their cross-border tax planning, 
and considered some possible explanations to this phenomenon. PIF 
investors are able to avoid taxation both at the jurisdictions of source 
and residence. This Part considers why this is a problem worthy of 
attention, and how to start approaching this problem. 
A. How Big is the Problem? 
PIFs are major players in the global economy. Private equity and 
hedge funds’ assets under management have consistently increased 
over the past few decades, to over $5 trillion combined in 2015.157  
According to a recent report by Bain & Company, in 2015 private 
equity funds raised $527 billion in new funds from investors,158 made 
$282 billion of new buyout investment,159 and realized $422 billion 
worth of portfolio investments.160 To see how big these numbers are, 
consider that the global M&A activity for 2015 amounted to about 
$4.7 trillion.161 In value terms, this means that almost nine percent of 
global M&A deals in 2015 involved an asset disposition by a private 
 
 157. Id. at 934. 
 158. BAIN & COMPANY, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, at 2 (2016). 
 159. Id. at 9. 
 160. Id. at 20. 
 161. Maureen Farrell, 2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2015,  6:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/2015-becomes-the-biggest-m-a-year-ever-
1449187101. 
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equity fund. This data does not include all hedge funds and all venture 
capital funds. 
With such huge deal values, significant tax revenues are at stake. 
It is impossible to estimate the revenue effects of PIFs’ international 
tax avoidance in a short symposium article. However, it is worth 
noting that the revenue losses associated with carried interest planning 
in the United States alone have been estimated at anywhere between 
$18 billion to $180 billion for a ten-year period.162 Such revenue losses 
are largely attributable to the tax planning associated with managers’ 
carried interest. Namely, the revenue losses are attributable to the 
deferral in recognition of twenty percent of the funds’ gains, and the 
conversion of such gains from ordinary income to capital gains. This 
Article addresses the rest of PIF gains, namely eighty percent, which 
to a large extent seems to go perpetually untaxed. Surely if the 
problem of fund managers’ tax planning calls for such a vibrant 
academic discussion, so does international tax avoidance associated 
with PIFs’ portfolios. 
B. Improving Transparency 
It is beyond the scope of a symposium article to offer a policy 
prescription to solve the issue of PIF international tax planning. This 
is so mostly because the problem is yet to be accurately defined. This 
Article identified some evidence suggesting that PIFs are particularly 
aggressive international taxpayers. It also offered some possible 
explanations to this phenomenon. However, while all the explanations 
proposed herein are plausible, none are proven. Much more research 
is required in order to understand the international tax behavior of 
PIFs. It is imperative to understand such behavior in order to try and 
tailor policy solutions that will not be easily avoided by creative tax 
planners, but also that would not unnecessarily stifle cross-border 
investment activity. 
The bottom line is that we need more information. The impetus 
for this Article was a leak by a whistleblower that, for the first time, 
offered us an opportunity to systematically assess the international tax 
behavior of PIFs operating through one particular jurisdiction. And 
this short glimpse into the world of PIF international tax planning is 
 
 162. Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carried-
interest-tax-could-raise-180-billion.html?_r=0 (discussing the different revenue loss estimates 
attributable to the carried interest loophole). 
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troubling. But it seems unwise to rely on whistleblowers to formulate 
tax policy. Rather, a more thorough and systematic study is required. 
The problem, however, is that PIFs are rarely subject to reporting 
requirements and are rarely taxable entities themselves. There are 
currently no sources to provide the necessary data. 
Luckily, this problem is not unprecedented nor without solutions. 
One of the greatest successes of the BEPS Project is the Country-by-
Country reporting. For years, one of the main difficulties of tax 
administrators in auditing MNEs was the fact that administrators only 
had piecemeal information. MNEs engaged in aggressive planning 
involving intra-group transactions to reduce their tax bills. The pricing 
of transactions between affiliated entities were set so as to have income 
generated in high-tax jurisdictions reported in low-tax jurisdictions. 
The ability of each tax administration to tackle such issues on its own 
was very limited, since taxpayers were only required to provide 
information to each country as required by domestic laws. Each 
country saw only one side of the intercompany deal but never saw the 
big picture. Moreover, intercompany pricing reports are confidential, 
so the public did not see the full picture either. 
It took several outrageous media exposés showing how 
intercompany pricing enabled multinational corporations to legally 
eliminate billions of dollars of tax liabilities and how opacity 
contributed to such schemes.163 The BEPS Project engaged those 
issues with Action 13, which established the framework for CBCR. 
Under the CBCR framework, an MNE will be required to report its 
worldwide operations both in its countries of residence and its 
countries of operation. While the mechanics of such reporting are 
complex,164 the idea is pretty simple: to let tax authorities have the full 
picture of MNE inter-company transactions. MNEs will have to report 
not only the taxable income they have in each jurisdiction, but must 
also report their activities, assets and employees in each jurisdiction 
and properly document the methods by which profits are split within 
the affiliated group. Thus, when a company with no assets or 
employees reports a gain of billions of dollars while an affiliate with 
factories on the ground reports no income, red flags will be raised. 
 
 163. Brauner, supra note 4, at 57 (describing media reports on corporate tax avoidance). 
 164. For the final CBCR report, see OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
PROJECT, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, 
ACTION 13 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en. 
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The adoption of the CBCR standard has been described as “the 
single most important achievement of the so-called civil society 
involvement with international tax policy shaping.”165 The OECD 
introduced model CBCR legislation, and several model international 
instruments including a convention for the exchange of CBCR 
information.166 Some countries have also unilaterally adopted or 
intend to adopt CBCR rules.167 
Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent a PIF would be 
captured by the CBCR revolution. The reasons for this are twofold: 
First, conceptually, it is difficult to envision the implementation of 
CBCR in the PIF context. CBCR is largely intended to address 
intercompany transactions between affiliated corporations. This is 
sensible since corporations are taxable entities, whilePIFs, for the most 
part, are not. PIFs are transparent entities. The beneficiaries of PIFs’ 
intercompany dealings are the investors, not the PIFs themselves. In 
other words, PIFs are not taxable “parents” of affiliated groups. To be 
sure, Action 13 specifically recommends that CBCR apply to 
“investment funds,”168 and a recent CBCR directive proposed by the 
European Union seemed to be applicable to PIFs.169 However, it is 
unclear how—as a conceptual matter—CBCR would apply to a non-
taxable entity that does not have to report its worldwide income to 
any country, and, in many instances, is not even viewed as the owner 
of taxable gains. Unfortunately, Action 13 provides little-to-no 
guidance on how CBCR should be applied to pass-through entities. 
 
 165. Baruner, supra note 4, at 105. 
 166. OECD, MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE 
OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTS (2015), https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/cbc-mcaa.pdf. As of October 2016, 49 countries have signed this instrument. See 
OECD, SIGNATORIES OF THE MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT ON THE 
EXCHANGE OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTS (2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf. 
 167. For example, the Treasury Department recently proposed regulations to mandate 
CBCR for U.S. corporations. Country-by-Country Reporting, Prop. Treas. Reg. 109822-15, 
80 Fed. Reg. 79795 (Dec. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 1). 
 168. OECD, supra note 164, at 21 (“In particular, no special industry exemptions should 
be provided, no general exemption for investment funds should be provided, and no exemption 
for non-corporate entities or non-public corporate entities should be provided.”). 
 169. See Attracta Mooney & Chris Flood, New Tax Rules for Large European Funds, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/29982114-07dd-11e6-a623-
b84d06a39ec2.html#axzz4FAs5OGhr (discussing the application of CBCR to certain 
asset managers). 
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A second reason that PIFs may avoid CBCR is that CBCR is 
limited by a value threshold. For example, Action 13 recommends that 
CBCR will only apply to affiliated groups with an annual revenue of 
at least EUR 750 million.170 Few (if any) PIFs meet that threshold. 
Most PIFs do not manage more than a few portfolio investments at a 
time. Fund managers raise capital, invest, dispose of investments, and 
then raise capital again for a new fund. Even if managers are successful, 
it is difficult to imagine that at any given time many PIFs generate 
EUR 750 million in annual revenue. 
The main recommendation, therefore, is to extend the framework 
of CBCR to ensure that it applies to PIFs. More specifically, it suggests 
that CBCR should view PIFs as opaque entities. For reporting 
purposes, PIFs should be viewed as a corporate parent of an 
affiliated entity. 
A second recommendation is to significantly lower the value 
threshold of CBCR for PIFs, or to aggregate it over a period of several 
years, so as to make sure that PIFs are captured by the 
reporting requirements. 
Like in the context of multinational corporations, it is hoped that 
PIFs’ compliance with CBCR would provide information to tax 
authorities, researchers and the public to better understand PIF tax 
behavior and enable the promulgation of PIF-specific tax policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article was motivated by a leak of hundreds of ATAs granted 
by Luxembourg to MNEs. An analysis of the leaked documents 
demonstrates that PIFs are the most active industry in seeking tax-
reducing private rulings in Luxembourg. This finding is rather 
surprising when one considers current international tax discourse, 
which is almost exclusively focused on inter-company transactions 
between affiliated corporations, usually from IP-reliant industries. 
This raises the question: is systematic international tax avoidance by 
PIF-controlled entities something that requires the attention of 
tax policymakers? 
The argument advanced herein is that the answer is “yes.” PIF-
controlled entities face fewer constraints on their international tax 
planning, compared with non-PIF-controlled entities. Short 
investment horizons mitigate the deterrent effects of tax audits, 
 
 170. OECD, supra note 164, at 39. 
1715 The Other Eighty Percent 
 1763 
reputational considerations, and investors’ oversight. Short 
investment horizons may also contribute to lack of commitment to 
the success of the jurisdictions in which PIFs invest. In addition, there 
is some evidence suggesting that aggressive tax behavior by PIF 
managers in their personal capacity may contribute to aggressive 
behavior by the portfolio company. Finally, PIFs are rarely subject to 
tax reporting requirements. This enables PIF to aggressively reduce 
source-jurisdiction tax. 
The largely tax-exempt investor base also contributes to PIFs’ 
aggressive tax behavior. Taxable investors’ tax liabilities may be 
affected by PIF portfolio planning. Such investors may have tax 
interests adversarial to those of the fund managers, and, as such, may 
mitigate aggressive tax behavior at the portfolio level. Most PIF 
investors, however, are tax-exempt. In the international context, this 
problem is magnified because otherwise taxable investors become 
functionally tax-exempt. In fact, in most PIFs the only sizable taxable 
investor is probably the manager, whose carried interest is subject to 
tax. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the manager’s personal 
tax stance drives PIF portfolio international tax planning. Most 
importantly, however, the sizable tax-exempt investor base suggests 
that income that was not taxed at the source jurisdiction remains 
exempt at the jurisdiction of residence. In other words, most income 
earned by PIFs in cross-border transactions is unlikely to ever be taxed.  
It is difficult to address such issues given the lack of information 
we currently have about PIFs’ tax behavior. PIFs disclose very little 
information. Research and resulting policy changes cannot seriously 
be expected to rely on the goodness-of-heart of whistleblowers. We 
need a systematic information collection system. Action 13 of the 
BEPS Project offers such an instrument in the form of CBCR. 
Unfortunately, as currently drafted, it is reasonable to assume that 
most PIFs would avoid the CBCR requirements. Therefore, CBCR 
should be expanded to ensure that most PIFs are included. 
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